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Systemic Risk: Changing the Regulatory
Perspective∗
Jean-Charles Rochet
University of Zu¨rich and Toulouse School of Economics
The article puts forward the view that the regulatory per-
spective on systemic risk should be changed drastically. The
sub-prime crisis has indeed revealed many loopholes in the
supervisory/regulatory framework for banks—in particular,
the inability to deal with the too-big-to-fail syndrome and
also the lack of resiliency of interbank and money markets.
To a large extent, the contagion phenomena that took place in
these markets were the necessary outcomes of the passive atti-
tude of banking supervisors, who have let large banks develop a
complex and opaque nexus of bilateral obligations. We propose
two reforms: adopting a platform-based (instead of institution-
based) regulatory perspective on systemic risk and encouraging
a generalized move to central counterparty clearing.
JEL Codes: G21, L51.
1. Introduction
This article puts forward the view that the regulatory perspective on
systemic risk should be changed drastically. Indeed, the sub-prime
crisis has revealed many loopholes in the supervisory/regulatory sys-
tem. But the main lesson that can be drawn from the actions taken
(and statements made) by public authorities during this crisis is
∗This paper was prepared as a commentary on the third session of the Second
Financial Stability Conference of the International Journal of Central Banking,
Madrid, Bank of Spain, June 17–18, 2010. It draws on my keynote address in
the Annual Meeting of the Finnish Economic Association, Turku (February 5–6,
2009), as well as my presentations in the 54th Economic Conference of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, Cape Cod (October 21–23, 2009) and in the 4th annual
meeting of the Swiss Finance Institute, Zu¨rich (November 30, 2009). I thank the
participants in these meetings for their useful comments.
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that, in the future, any large financial institution that encounters
financial problems can expect to be bailed out by public authorities
on the grounds that it is too big to fail (TBTF) (alternative terms are
too interconnected to fail, large and complex banking organization,
or systemically important financial institution). The turmoil that fol-
lowed the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 has indeed
led politicians to believe they had to commit to an unconditional
support of any troubled financial institution whose failure might cre-
ate major disruptions. Of course, this commitment is a disaster in
terms of moral hazard and market discipline. From a forward-looking
perspective, public authorities could not convey a worse message to
market participants and bank managers.
A similar pattern emerged after the Continental Illinois bailout
in 1984,1 and at the time, it took more than five years for market
discipline to be somewhat restored.2 But this bailout was a sin-
gle event, and the Comptroller of the Currency at the time tried to
maintain, as much as he could, some ambiguity on which banks were
really TBTF. Today there is no more ambiguity: all large financial
institutions will always be rescued. Public authorities of G-20 coun-
tries have even agreed to publicly commit to a systematical bailout.
Unless resolute reforms are undertaken, it will probably take a very
long time to restore market discipline again. The situation is even
aggravated by the fact that an indirect outcome of the crisis is an
increased concentration of the banking systems of many countries,
the surviving banks becoming even bigger than before and, in some
countries at least, close to being too big to be bailed out.
Another major source of concern for public authorities is the
complete lack of resiliency of interbank and money markets during
the recent crisis. It is amazing to see how some shocks to the rela-
tively small sub-prime market could lead to the complete dry-up of
1In May of 1984, Continental Illinois was bailed out by the U.S. federal gov-
ernment. It was only the seventh largest bank in the United States, but it was
a money-center bank holding large deposits of hundreds of smaller banks. U.S.
supervisors feared that its failure could propagate toward many of these smaller
banks.
2Flannery and Sorescu (1996) show that banks’ debt spreads only started
reflecting default risks around 1989, after a regulatory transition toward letting
market participants share the losses when a banking firm fails.
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liquidity markets for more than a year. This paper argues that this
lack of resiliency is due to a fundamental mistake in the way these
markets were conceived. To a large extent, the contagion phenom-
ena that took place on these markets were the necessary outcomes
of the passive attitude of banking supervisors, who have let large
banks develop an enormous and opaque nexus of bilateral obliga-
tions. In Rochet and Tirole (1996), Jean Tirole and I explored the
theoretical justifications of such a decentralized organization of the
interbank markets and found only one possible answer: market dis-
cipline. More precisely, we found that the only possible explanation
why prudential authorities could have let banks organize the trade
of their reserves vis-a`-vis the central bank in an over-the-counter
(OTC) fashion was the hope to promote what we called peer mon-
itoring, i.e., the mutual surveillance of banks by their competitors.
However, this hope was misplaced: the price to pay for this mutual
surveillance—namely, the risk of contagion—was too heavy. Market
discipline could only have worked if public authorities could have
convinced market participants that they would not intervene if a
systemic crisis occurred, which revealed not credible.
A logical consequence of this result, which we did not put for-
ward clearly enough in Rochet and Tirole (1996), is that the cur-
rent, decentralized, organization of interbank markets has a huge
cost (contagion risk) but no benefit. Market discipline does not
work for the interbank market, not only because of the strong like-
lihood of a public bailout in the event of a crisis but also because
of the faulty conception of its industrial organization. Decentralized
trading of bank reserves has a major drawback: it bundles liquid-
ity risk with counterparty risk, which makes price discovery almost
impossible.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
traditional justifications for prudential regulation of banks. Section 3
examines what is left of these justifications after the crisis. Section 4
illustrates the main issues with a discussion of the main concerns for
the repo market. Section 5 shows that the traditional paradigm of
banking theory has become obsolete. Section 6 advocates in favor of
a generalization of centralized trading and systemic risk. Section 7
suggests a way to change the regulatory perspective on systemic risk.
Section 8 concludes.
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2. Banking Regulation: The Classical Doctrine
The traditional doctrine holds that prudential regulation of banks
is essentially justified by two reasons:
• It protects depositors and limits the liability of deposit insur-
ance funds.
This is microprudential regulation, analyzed in detail by
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). Without going into detail, the
important ingredients of an efficient microprudential regula-
tion are independence and accountability of supervisors, use
of market discipline, a lender-of-last-resort policy governed
by the Bagehot principles, no injection of public money, and
cost-minimizing resolution of failures. This doctrine is best
illustrated by the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA), which articulated very clearly
the notion of prompt corrective action.
• It protects the banking and financial “systems.”
This is macroprudential regulation. It aims at avoid-
ing contagious failures, spillovers, and major disruptions to
the banking and financial system. It justifies renouncing all
the principles stated above, i.e., introducing exceptions to
FDICIA, possible intervention of the Treasury, liquidity injec-
tions by the central bank, and (temporarily?) abandoning the
recourse to market discipline.
This duality between micro- and macroprudential regulations is
well illustrated by the doctrine employed by the Bank of Canada
(1995) in its lender-of-last-resort policies:
For solvent financial institutions requiring . . . credit, the Bank
can provide Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA). ELA is
intended to overcome a market failure associated with finan-
cial institutions that have a significant share of their liabilities
as “deposits” (fixed-value promises to pay, redeemable at very
short notice) and whose assets are generally highly illiquid. The
Bank of Canada Act requires that such lending be secured by
collateral pledged by the borrowing institution. . . . The collat-
eral eligible to secure credit from the SLF is the same as that eli-
gible for intraday credit in the Large Value Transfer System. . . .
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It is the policy of the Bank to lend only to institutions that are
judged to be solvent in order to mitigate moral hazard that can
arise from such potential intervention, and to avoid damaging
the interests of unsecured creditors.
In conditions of severe and unusual stress on the finan-
cial system more generally, the Bank has authority to provide
liquidity through outright purchases of a wide variety of securi-
ties issued by any Canadian or foreign entities, including non-
financial firms. . . . In other words, the Bank has the authority to
provide liquidity to a broad range of financial and non-financial
institutions when the Governor of the Bank judges that such
transactions are justified to safeguard the safety and soundness
of Canada’s financial system.
This is all very fine. Alas, the sub-prime crisis has shown that
these doctrines were largely insufficient.
3. What’s Left of the Classical Doctrine After the Crisis
One of the striking features of the sub-prime crisis was that shocks
to the relatively small sub-prime market could provoke the distress
of vital parts of the financial infrastructure, especially interbank and
money markets. This overreaction was largely due to the uncertainty
of market participants about the impact that a decline in real estate
prices and the beginning of a recession might have on a sizable frac-
tion of the assets held by large banks. These large banks are the
main players in these liquidity markets, which are vital to modern
economies.
Confronted with this freezing of money markets, central banks
did what they could to substitute these failing markets. They orga-
nized several kinds of lending facilities and de facto provided the
intermediation of a large part of liquidity flows among banks and
also between banks and some non-banks. In parallel, public author-
ities all over the world injected large amounts of capital and pro-
vided a whole spectrum of guarantees to financial institutions, in
the hope of restarting these vital liquidity markets. These (largely
improvised) interventions were very costly and only partially suc-
ceeded in restarting liquidity markets and restoring confidence. But
the important message is that the justification for public intervention
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was not so much avoiding contagious failures but rather maintain-
ing the integrity of some parts of financial infrastructure that are
deemed “vital” to the economy.
As for the future, envisaging less costly ways to maintain finan-
cial stability should be on the top of the reform agenda. In particular,
it would be disastrous to let market participants consider that all
large financial institutions will always be rescued (and their creditors
insured) if they are again in a situation of financial distress. Tax-
payers of most countries will not be willing to accept a second dose
of the sort of blanket guarantees that governments have committed
to provide to large financial institutions in the hope of maintaining
financial stability.
As I already argued, the main issue is how to improve supervi-
sion of systemically critical firms and to strengthen the resilience
of the financial system to the unwinding of such a large firm. This
implies that any “systemically important” firm must receive espe-
cially close supervisory oversight of its risk taking, risk management,
and financial condition, and be held to high capital and liquidity
standards.
This poses the major difficulty of identifying these TBTF firms.
What criteria should be used to determine when a firm (not neces-
sarily a bank) is TBTF and when it is not? The paper by Chen Zhou
(2010), presented in this session, proposes new statistical measures
of systemic risk building on previous contributions by Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2009) and Goodhart and Segoviano (2009). Another
interesting approach is the methodology proposed by Tarashev,
Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2009) for the allocation of systemwide risk
to each individual institution, in line with its systemic importance.
This methodology combines statistical risk measures with the Shap-
ley value, a widely used solution concept in cooperative game theory.
This approach could be used to provide guidelines for defining which
firms should be subject to an alternative regime as systemically
important, and the process for invoking that regime. A more prag-
matic solution could be to adapt the procedures used for invoking
the so-called systemic risk exception under FDICIA.
Another important question is which agency should decide which
institutions are systemic. Many central banks around the world
already have an explicit statutory basis for their oversight of critical
payment and settlement systems. As I argue in more detail below, a
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natural corollary is that these central banks should also be in charge
of systemic risk supervision and, in particular, should decide which
institutions are systemic and which are not. This is not the current
situation in the United States, where the Federal Reserve does not
have explicit oversight authority for systemically important payment
and settlement systems. Reforming this might be reasonable.
The main lesson that can be drawn from the behavior of public
authorities during the sub-prime crisis is that protecting finan-
cial infrastructure—i.e., the institutions that support trading, pay-
ments, clearing, and settlement—has become the fundamental rea-
son behind macroprudential regulation and supervision. The aim
here is not only to make the financial system as a whole more
resilient but also to reduce the need for future government inter-
vention. I claim that this requires a drastic change in the regula-
tory/supervisory perspective.
4. An Illustration: The Repo Market
A repo is a sale of securities coupled with an agreement to repurchase
the securities at a specific price on a later date. Repo markets per-
form essential functions: first, they provide secured investments to
cash investors on the money market; second, they allow the borrow-
ing and lending of securities; and third, they indirectly boost liquid-
ity on crucial financial markets such as debt markets (especially
Treasuries) and derivatives markets.
To avoid the collapse of these markets during the crisis, central
banks have taken extraordinary actions. For example, the Federal
Reserve has established temporary facilities such as the Primary
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and the Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF) to provide liquidity to market participants. Other
central banks like the European Central Bank and the Bank of Eng-
land have agreed to lend to more counterparties and have enlarged
the scope of eligible collateral. However, these facilities have not pre-
vented a sharp reduction in the activity of these repo markets, as
illustrated by figure 1, taken from Financial Times (2009).
In the United States, a very popular form of repo is the tri-
party repo, in which an intermediary (a clearing bank) facilitates
transactions by providing operational services (custody of securities,
settlement, valuation of collateral) and, more importantly, extending
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Figure 1. Impact of the Crisis
intraday credit to market participants. On average, more than $1.7
trillion was exchanged in this way in the United States every working
day of the first quarter of 2010.
There are several reasons why this market poses several threats
to financial stability (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2010). For
one, the U.S. market is completely dominated by only two clear-
ing banks: Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase, which
are thus perfect examples of systemic institutions. Moreover, par-
ticipation in this market is also very concentrated: the ten biggest
dealer banks represent 85 percent of cash borrowing and 65 per-
cent of security lending (with a typical position, for a large dealer,
of around $200 billion). Moreover, the main actors are also big in
other markets. For example, JP Morgan Chase is also the largest
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OTC derivatives dealer in the United States (with a $79 trillion
notional position at the end of 2009) and the largest manager of
hedge funds (with $53.5 billion in assets under management at the
end of 2009). The risk of contagion to and from the repo markets is
thus enormous.
There are also other, equally important concerns (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York 2010), such as the fact that this market
relies on huge amounts of intraday credit. This is because all tri-
party repos are unwound each morning, even if most of them are
renewed later in the day. Moreover, there is no regulatory oversight
of this market. It is quite opaque, and some of its big actors are
foreign and thus not directly supervised by U.S. authorities. This
has led to many forms of inadequate risk-management practices by
cash lenders and clearing banks, such as huge maturity mismatch,
high leverage, and very loose collateral policies. Finally, there are no
clear contingency plans for sharing losses and managing collateral in
the event a large participant defaults.
In 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York asked a group of
senior U.S. bankers to make recommendations for addressing these
concerns, and subsequently published a white paper on the issue
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2010). The most important of
these recommendations were as follows: to perform an automatic
substitution of securities when a repo is renewed, in order to reduce
the need for intraday credit; to improve risk-management practices
of dealers and clearing banks; and to improve transparency, notably
by mandating the disclosure of aggregate statistics on collateral and
haircuts.
But even if these measures are implemented, they will eliminate
the main issues: first, the two clearing banks are too big to fail; sec-
ond, the risks taken by large banks in other markets can spill over to
the repo market (and vice versa); and finally, there will still be a risk
of a run on a large dealer at the slightest suspicion of its solvency.
5. The Need for a New Paradigm in the Theory
of Banking
The classical model of banking (Diamond and Dybvig 1983) is inad-
equate for describing the activities of large modern banks. Let us
briefly recall the main features of this model, which was very influ-
ential in developing our understanding of commercial banking:
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• Banks transform short-term retail deposits into long-term
opaque loans.
• The socially optimal degree of maturity transformation
depends on the preferences of households (which determine
the liquidity insurance needs of depositors) and on the tech-
nology of firms (which determines the investment needs of
borrowers).
• Maturity transformation generates an intrinsic instability of
banks, which calls for some form of regulation.
• Bank runs can be prevented by an adequate combination of
deposit insurance, solvency regulation, and microprudential
supervision.
As shown very clearly in Duffie’s (2010) book (How Big Banks
Fail and What to Do about It), this is not how big banks live and die
nowadays. We need to build a different model, along the following
lines:
• Dealer banks intermediate the “backbone” markets for secu-
rities and derivatives.
• They invest in marketable securities (as opposed to opaque
loans) and also provide a whole bundle of services to investors
(collateralized lending, asset management, brokerage services,
etc.).
• Transformation is used to provide more liquidity to investors
(but how much is too much?).
• The sources of fragility of these banks are different: ill-designed
market infrastructures and excess transformation.
Indeed, modern runs on a bank take different routes (Duffie
2010): wholesale deposits (as in the Northern Rock case), novation
(see a definition of this term below) demands by the counterparties
of the bank on OTC contracts (as in the case of Bear Stearns), and
flight of prime brokerage clients (as in the case of Morgan Stanley).
New sources of fragility have appeared: collateral triggers after down-
grades (as in the case of AIG Financial Products) and ultimately loss
of clearing/settlement privileges (as in the case of Lehman Brothers).
In fact, the risk of contagion in interbank markets is largely due
to two difficulties: the default externalities generated by the existing
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complex nexus of OTC transactions, and the legal uncertainty about
loss-sharing rules in the event a large participant defaults, which
provides an incentive to run at the slightest suspicion of problems.
The proposed remedies are too radical (like the Volker rule) or
difficult to implement, such as the “living wills” (Herring 2010),
additional regulatory requirements for firms identified as “sys-
temic,” the international harmonization of resolution procedures
(Avgouleas, Goodhart, and Schoenmaker 2010), and finally the
international cooperation between supervisors (which is unlikely to
be effective when needed, as illustrated by Dewatripont, Rochet, and
Tirole 2010).
We propose simpler (but more radical) ways to solve these diffi-
culties:
• Adopt the central counterparty clearing (CCP) model for all
“vital” market infrastructures.
• Change the regulatory perspective (platform based instead of
institution based).
These two proposals are now discussed in turn.
6. Generalizing Central Counterparty Clearing
Many commentators have argued that the lack of transparency of
interbank exposures on money markets and derivatives has played a
major role in the propagation of the crisis. OTC transactions are typ-
ically very opaque and can be a major source of systemic risk. U.S.
Secretary Geithner has fostered the development of central clear-
ing platforms for credit derivatives. Along the same lines, Pennac-
chi (2009) discusses deposit-insurance-related reforms that would
improve the efficiency of the financial system. The first reform he
identifies is “to mitigate TBTF by reducing counterparty risk via
centralized clearing (and possibly exchange-trading) of derivatives.”
See also Bernanke (2009): “To help alleviate counterparty credit
concerns, regulators are also encouraging the development of well-
regulated and prudently managed central clearing counterparties for
OTC trades.”
Bernanke (2009) puts forward a similar proposal for repo
markets:
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The Federal Reserve and other authorities also are focusing on
enhancing the resilience of the tri-party repurchase agreement
(repo) market, in which the primary dealers and other major
banks and broker-dealers obtain very large amounts of secured
financing from money-market mutual funds and other short-
term, risk-averse sources of funding. For some time, market par-
ticipants have been working to develop a contingency plan for
handling a loss of confidence in either of the two clearing banks
that facilitate the settlement of tri-party repos. Recent experi-
ence demonstrates the need for additional measures to enhance
the resilience of these markets, particularly as large borrowers
have experienced acute stress. The Federal Reserve’s Primary
Dealer Credit Facility, launched in the wake of the Bear Stearns
collapse and expanded in the aftermath of the Lehman Broth-
ers bankruptcy, has stabilized this critical market, and market
confidence has been maintained. However, this program was
adopted under our emergency powers to address unusual and
exigent circumstances. Therefore, more-permanent reforms are
needed. For example, it may be worthwhile considering the costs
and benefits of a central clearing system for this market, given
the magnitude of exposures generated and the vital importance
of the market to both dealers and investors.
The guiding principle of central counterparty clearing is that
after two parties have agreed on a trade, the clearing platform steps
into each trade by acting as counterparty to each side. This is called
novation, a mechanism by which the platform essentially becomes
“the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.” This mecha-
nism allows the netting of multilateral (not only bilateral) exposures
but also the centralization of collateral, which introduces diversifi-
cation effects, especially if there is some degree of cross-pledging
between different types of markets.
To reduce the risk and possible consequences of a default by
a clearing member or one of its customers, CCPs have developed
several risk-management procedures. The primary protection is pro-
vided by initial margin, a deposit which clearing members are
required to place in an account with the CCP. CCPs typically also
make margin calls to ensure that they remain protected over time
as prices change. They usually also have access to additional default
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resources, such as mutual guarantee funds or insurance cover, and
require clearing members to fulfill financial requirements to reduce
the likelihood of default.
To protect themselves and the clearing house against client
defaults, members are generally required to set a minimum level
of margin for their clients according to rules set down by the clear-
ing house. De facto, CCP failures have been extremely rare. Knott
and Mills (2002) find only three cases: Paris in 1973, Kuala Lumpur
in 1983, and Hong Kong in 1987.
In principle, CCPs mark to market positions daily. Thus they
should be exposed only to the extent that a one-day price movement
exhausts the entire margin of a clearing member. In practice, CCPs
may be exposed over a longer period, as it may take time to decide
whether a member should be declared in default and then to close
out positions. Several studies have attempted to quantify the poten-
tial exposure of clearing houses over one or more days. Some of
these models are purely statistical and pre-specify acceptable cov-
erage levels in a purely exogenous fashion. By contrast, Fenn and
Kupiec (1993) develop a model that aims at minimizing the total
sum of margin, settlement costs, and the cost of settlement failure.
Clearing houses need to trade off several objectives when they set
their margins. Requiring high margins and good-quality collateral is
costly to members. Marking positions to market and settling gains
or losses, on either a daily or more frequent basis, also entails costs.
To arrive at an optimal margin level, the clearing house must bal-
ance these costs against the potential losses resulting from a default
of contracts.
By helping to manage counterparty risk and by providing netting
services, CCPs allow market participants to economize on collateral,
compared with what they would otherwise need to hold to ensure
equivalent protection in bilaterally cleared markets. Regulators also
often recognize the reduction in counterparty risk by allowing clear-
ing members to hold less capital than if they were exposed directly
to other market participants. Clearing members may also reduce the
resources spent on monitoring individual counterparties, insofar as
their actual counterparty is the CCP. Through the design of clearing
members’ margining and collateral requirements, CCPs reduce the
probability of immediate propagation to solvent members of losses
incurred by the insolvent one.
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Moreover, a CCP clearly improves transparency, which explains
why reforms are often resisted by those currently enjoying an infor-
mation advantage (i.e., the major OTC derivatives dealers). As
exemplified by the Lehman failure, when a major player in bilater-
ally cleared derivatives markets fails, it is not immediately apparent
to the remaining market participants (who are absorbing the losses)
how big the losses are and how the failed firm’s counterparties are
affected. The effects of this uncertainty can be devastating on mar-
ket confidence, as illustrated by Bear Stearns, Lehman, and AIG.
This uncertainty is mitigated by a CCP that has effective means of
allocating losses and no incentive to use the information it holds for
its own profits. This neutrality alleviates the information concerns
of market participants. A CCP also increases operational efficiency,
by centralizing the monitoring of trades and reducing potential for
disputes.
CCPs have proven to be resilient even under stressed market con-
ditions such as the ones we are facing today and have showed their
ability to ensure normal market functioning in the event of failure of
a major market player. A case in point is the successful unwinding
of the interest rate swap positions left open following the default of
Lehman Brothers.
7. A Change in Regulatory Perspective: Protecting
Platforms, Not Banks
The main objective of macroprudential regulation should be to pro-
tect platforms (i.e., vital parts of financial infrastructure), not indi-
vidual banks! Many central banks are given the rather vague objec-
tive of “maintaining financial stability,” which gives them too much
discretion and opens the door to lobbying by large institutions and
political pressure. This could be limited if central banks were given
a more precise mandate. The one I propose here is to guarantee
the integrity of a precise list of financial markets and infrastructures
that are deemed “vital”: interbank (both secured and repo) markets,
money markets, and some derivative markets and large-value pay-
ment systems (LVPSs). To do so, it would be useful to learn from the
experience of private clearing houses, which have developed sophis-
ticated policies for protecting themselves against the failure of their
participants.
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Typically, private clearing houses distinguish between their mem-
bers, who have a privileged status, and ordinary participants. In
counterpart to their privileged status, the clearing members are sup-
posed to implement a set of risk-mitigation policies, such as collateral
and capital requirements and bilateral credit limits. For example,
members are typically required to make an upfront deposit to a
default fund intended to cover losses that exceed the defaulting mem-
ber’s margins. I believe central banks could adopt a similar policy
and condition the direct participation of financial institutions to the
“vital” part of the financial infrastructure on special requirements
(such as solvency and liquidity requirements) that would go beyond
the standard requirements imposed on deposit-taking institutions
by microprudential regulators.
In effect, my proposal would aim at replacing the notion of “sys-
temically important institution” with that of “systemically impor-
tant platform.” Such platforms would only be directly accessible to
a group of “officially recognized financial institutions” that would
have to comply with special regulatory requirements and would be
directly supervised by the central bank. The status of “officially rec-
ognized financial institution” could be revoked by the central bank
if these special regulatory requirements are not satisfied. A special
resolution procedure would be created for these institutions, so that
the central bank has the legal powers to close it down, or at least
restrict its activities before it is too late. Again, this is line with the
position recently expressed by Bernanke (2009):
The United States also needs improved tools to allow the orderly
resolution of a systemically important non-bank financial firm,
including a mechanism to cover the costs of the resolution.
In most cases, federal bankruptcy laws provide an appropri-
ate framework for the resolution of non-bank financial insti-
tutions. However, this framework does not sufficiently protect
the public’s strong interest in ensuring the orderly resolution of
non-depository financial institutions when a failure would pose
substantial systemic risks. Improved resolution procedures for
these firms would help reduce the too-big-to-fail problem by
narrowing the range of circumstances that might be expected
to prompt government intervention to keep the firm operating.
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These “officially recognized financial institutions” would be the
equivalent of existing “systemically important institutions,” which
have access to special liquidity assistance facilities and possible gov-
ernment guarantees in case of distress. But there would be an impor-
tant difference: the central bank would choose who belongs to the
club and who does not! If the advantages associated with member-
ship far exceeded the costs, the threat of revoking the status would
work as an important disciplining device. OTC markets would still
be active, but since they would be penalized by regulation, it is
likely that they would become small and therefore not in a position
to jeopardize the entire system.
Traditional prudential regulation is targeted at financial firms
(institutions based). The new regulation/supervision of systemic risk
would instead be targeted at infrastructures (platform based). Each
systemic authority would be mandated to guarantee (separately)
the safety of the small number of infrastructures (exchanges, CCPs,
LVPSs) that are deemed “vital” within its jurisdiction (political
decision). This would have significant advantages:
• There would be no need to reinvent the wheel for regula-
tory requirements: it would be enough to adopt market best
practice put in place by private CCPs.
• There would be less need for “living wills”: loss-sharing proce-
dures would be specified ex ante at the level of each platform.
• There would be less need for international cooperation of
supervisors: each “platform” would have to be sound inde-
pendently of what is going on elsewhere.
• This would eliminate the rationale for splitting or downsizing
banks (thus preserving scale and scope economies).
Note that this perspective differs from “functional supervision”:
several activities can be performed on the same platform, while the
same activity can be performed on several platforms.
8. Conclusion
This paper puts forward a change of regulatory perspective on sys-
temic risk and suggests a reversal of the balance of power between
large banks and supervisors. Instead of letting some banks grow
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big and opaque enough to constitute a threat to the financial sys-
tem, my proposal is to let the central bank, as the systemic risk
supervisor, decide which banks are safe enough to be allowed as
members of the financial “platforms” that are deemed vital for the
economy: large-value payment systems, unsecured and collateralized
interbank markets, and some derivative markets. The central bank
would receive an explicit mandate for guaranteeing the continuity of
these platforms and for regulating membership.
If the advantages associated with membership to these platforms
far exceeded the costs, the threat of revoking the member status
would work as an important disciplining device. OTC markets would
still be active, but since they would be penalized by regulation, it is
likely that they would become small and therefore not in a position
to jeopardize the entire system.
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